Land & Renewables Connection

Commonwealth Court Says “No” to Gas Well Facilities and Homes on Same Lots

* This post was co-authored by Zayba N. Chauhdry, a 2025 Summer Associate at Houston Harbaugh and a rising 3L at the Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University.

In a June 13, 2025 decision, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a municipality impermissibly granted conditional use approval to an oil and gas well pad and interconnect facility on tax lots that were already occupied by single family residences. This decision, in Protect Elizabeth Township v. Elizabeth Township Board of Commissioners, No. 830 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 13, 2025) is yet another chapter in the long-running saga about where oil and gas well sites can be located in Pennsylvania.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009) set the scene for this discussion. In Huntley & Huntley, the Supreme Court held that a municipal zoning ordinance addressing “where” oil and gas wells could be located in a community was not preempted by the state Oil and Gas Act. Id. at 866. Consequently, municipalities with zoning ordinances can legislate “where” oil and gas related developments may occur.

Here, in Protect Elizabeth Township, Olympus Energy LLC and its subsidiary Hyperion Midstream LLC, sought to build a gas well pad on and related infrastructure on property in the “R-1” Rural Residential zoning district in Elizabeth Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. For its part, Olympus sought conditional use approval to develop and operate a natural gas well pad on a 187 acre lot in the Township’s R-1 rural residential district. Hyperion, submitted a conditional use application to construct a pipeline, access road, and interconnect pad on two adjacent lots in the same zoning district, with those lots being 63 acres and 32 acres in size. Hyperion’s proposed facilities would support the Olympus gas well pad.

At the time of these conditional use applications, each of the three lots already housed a single family dwelling. The Elizabeth Township Board of Commissioners convened public hearings and approved both conditional use applications in January 2023. The Board of Commissioners reasoned that oil and gas uses were authorized as conditional uses in the R-1 zoning district and that Hyperion and Olympus had satisfied the objective standards set out in the Township’s Oil and Gas Ordinance. The Board of Commissioners likewise concluded that objectors to the conditional use applications had not satisfied their burdens of showing that the proposed uses would cause harm beyond those typically associated with such development.

The municipal conditional use approvals were appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which affirmed. From there, a further appeal was taken to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which reversed the decisions below, concluding that the Board of Commissioners erred by approving the conditional use applications because the Township’s zoning ordinance prohibited additional principal structures on the lots where the well pad and interconnect facility were proposed to be located.

In their appeal, the objectors to the conditional use applications contended that the conditional use approvals were at-odds with Section 303(C) of the Township’s zoning ordinance. That zoning ordinance provision states that in zoning districts “where single-family dwellings or two-family dwellings are an authorized use or are a legally nonconforming use, the single-family dwelling or two-family dwelling shall be the only principal structure on the lot.” From this definition, the objectors reasoned that neither a well pad nor an interconnect facility could be constructed on any of the lots in question because those uses would be considered to have principal structures, thereby violating the ordinance requirement that the single family residences be the only principal structures on the lots. In opposition, Olympus and Hyperion argued that neither the gas well pad nor the interconnect facility was a principal structure because there would not be any enclosed buildings.

The “principal structure” question was not new to the appeal; it had been considered and rejected by the Board of Commissioners when it initially reviewed the conditional use applications. The Board of Commissioners reasoned that the “principal structure” restriction in the zoning ordinance only applied to structures, and not uses. From there, the Board of Commissioners had determined that neither the gas well pad nor the interconnect facility was a “building structure”, so they could not fall within the scope of the single “principal structure” ordinance requirement.

The Commonwealth Court analyzed the zoning ordinance’s definitions to determine whether the well pad and/or the interconnect facility was subject to the single “principal structure” requirement. The zoning ordinance defined a “principal building or structure” as “[t]he building structure in which the principal use is conducted.” That definition included subsidiary defined terms: “building” and “structure”. The zoning ordinance defined a “building’ as a “[a] roofed structure, enclosed by walls to be used for shelter, enclosure or protection of persons, goods, materials and animals.” The zoning ordinance defined a “structure” as “[a]ny manmade object having an ascertainable stationary location on or in land or water whether or not affixed to the land.”

With these definitions established, the next step for the Commonwealth Court was to examine the definitions’ interrelationships with one another, and their application to the gas well pad and interconnect facility. Although the definition of a “principal building or structure” stated that it was “[t]he building structure in which the principal use is conducted,” the Commonwealth Court determined that the conjunction “or” needed to be inserted in that definition between the word “building” and the word “structure”. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that insertion was necessary to avoid a scenario where the concept of a “principal structure” was superfluous. The Court reasoned that this additional word “or” did not conflict with the purpose or intent of the zoning ordinance, nor did it change its scope or effect. Based on that modification, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the well pad and the interconnect facility could each fall within the scope of a principal structure.

Since it concluded that the gas well pad and the interconnect facility could each be a principal structure under the Zoning Ordinance, the Commonwealth Court then evaluated whether the gas well pad and the interconnect facility were principal structures. The Commonwealth Court concluded that the gas well pad and the interconnect facility were each a principal structure “because they are ‘structures’ in which a ‘principal use is conducted.’” The Commonwealth Court reasoned that the gas well pad and the interconnect facility was each a “structure” under the zoning ordinance because they are “man-made objects with ascertainable stationary locations on land”. And, the Court viewed them as “principal uses” because they were a “primary and predominant use” of the tax lots in question - unconventional gas well development.

That, however, did not end the analysis. Both Olympus and Hyperion argued that even if their gas well pad and interconnect facility was a principal structure, they were nonetheless authorized under the municipal Oil and Gas Ordinance, which was contended to supersede Section 303(C) of the zoning ordinance. The conditional use applicants reasoned that the Oil and Gas Ordinance should control in the event of a conflict with the zoning ordinance because the Oil and Gas Ordinance was more specific on oil and gas matters than the general zoning ordinance and the Oil and Gas Ordinance was enacted later in time than Section 303(C) of the zoning ordinance.

The Commonwealth Court addressed that argument and found no conflict between the Oil and Gas Ordinance and the zoning ordinance that would result in one ordinance superseding another. The Commonwealth Court observed that the Oil and Gas Ordinance permitted oil, and gas uses as conditional uses in rural residential districts, but the Oil and Gas Ordinance did not stipulate that the single-principal-structure requirement in Section 303(C) of the zoning ordinance was inapplicable to oil and gas uses.

Therefore, because the oil and gas well pad and interconnect facility could not be lawfully added to lots that already had principal structures on them, the Commonwealth Court held that the Township Board of Commissioners lacked authority to approve the conditional use applications. Whether this decision will be appealed further, and the result of any appeal, is unknown at this point.

However, what is clear from this decision is the importance of the content of municipal ordinances, and the interplay between different parts of ordinances - or the interplay between entirely different ordinances. Municipal ordinances, particularly zoning ordinances and ordinances addressing subdivision and land development, can be lengthy and complex documents. When evaluating whether a particular use is authorized, or the requirements associated with that use, it is critical to review the text of the zoning ordinance and to evaluate what terms or provisions are “defined” and how they operate. That holds true of any zoning ordinance or any subdivision and land development ordinance, regardless of the subject matter.

On the oil and gas front, the decision at-hand reflects a continuing trend in disputes involving the placement of oil and gas infrastructure that has largely moved away from broad health, safety and welfare concerns and in the direction of challenges to granular elements of zoning ordinances. Given the increasing focus on solar energy facilities in the Commonwealth, it is likely that zoning challenges involving solar energy related ordinances and developments will likewise follow this path and focus on specific ordinance provisions and definitions, versus health, safety and welfare considerations.

Houston Harbaugh’s Renewable Energy, Zoning and Land Use practice assists clients with zoning and land use matters and the Firm’s Oil and Gas practice represents landowners in oil and gas matters. If you have questions about this post, contact Brendan A. O’Donnell at 412-288-2226 or odonnellba@hh-law.com.